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Estimating the effects of changing 
Social Security benefit formulas 
GARY S. FIELDS AND OLIVIA S. MITCHELL 
The U.S. Social Security system faces serious financial dif-
ficulties in both the short and the long run. The short-run 
problem is that the system has very meager financial re-
serves. In the long run—after the year 2010, when the post-
World-War-II baby-boom generation reaches retirement age— 
the financial problems of Social Security will intensify be-
cause of population aging and the consequent decline in the 
ratio of workers to retirees. 
These problems have led to proposed reforms aimed at 
assuring the financial stability of the system. The question 
addressed here is: what effects would these reforms have 
on three variables—retirement ages, retirement incomes, 
and the Social Security system? This paper highlights the 
estimated effects of four actual or proposed policy changes. 
The basic model and some of the effects are drawn from 
previous work.1 However, the estimates of the effects of 
Social Security reforms on the Social Security system itself 
are new. 
The life cycle framework 
The analytical framework is the economist's model of 
life cycle decisionmaking. This model maintains that inter-
temporal choices are made with reference to intertemporal 
preferences and an intertemporal budget set. Perhaps the 
most familiar application is to educational decisionmaking, 
wherein the individual is thought to decide how much 
schooling to acquire on the basis of his or her preferences 
and the income and job opportunities associated with alter-
nate educational attainments. The retirement decision is also 
regarded in life cycle terms.2 That is, the individual is viewed 
as deciding how long to work and when to retire on the 
basis of the income from various sources that would be 
realized at alternate retirement ages and the associated amounts 
of leisure.3 
The four reforms, similar to ones actually legislated in 
1983 or proposed for legislation, can be described as fol-
lows: 
Experiment A, which increases the normal retirement 
age. This means that a worker who retires at age 65 no 
longer receives a benefit equal to his PIA. Experiment A 
simulates the effect of raising this age to age 68, as was 
widely proposed. (What in fact was legislated was a change 
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to age 66 by the year 2009 and to age 67 by the year 2027.) 
Under the simulated reform, the PIA multiple is 1.00 at age 
68 and the early retirement reduction factor remains at 6% 
percent per year. Thus, the multiples under this experiment 
are .60 for retirement age 62 and .80 for retirement age 65, 
with corresponding reductions at other ages. (The 1983 leg-
islation set a minimum multiple of 70 percent.) 
Experiment B, which delays the cost-of-living adjust-
ment. Rules in effect in 1982 specified that a cost-of-living 
adjustment would take place each July, reflecting increases 
in the Consumer Price Index during the preceding calendar 
year. The 1983 legislative amendments delayed these in-
creases by an additional 6 months. This delay reduces real 
benefits by half the rate of inflation, or 2.3 percent, and has 
a relatively small effect. 
Experiment C, which raises the late retirement credit. This 
means that benefits are increased faster than 3 percent if 
retirement is postponed beyond age 65. We simulated a 6% 
percent per year late retirement credit, the same as the early 
retirement reduction factor. The multiple for retirement at 
age 68 would have risen from 1.09 to 1.20. (As it turned 
out, in 1983, Congress mandated a gradual increase in the 
late retirement credit, eventually reaching 8 percent per year 
as of the year 2009.) 
Experiment D, which changes the early retirement reduction 
factor. This proposal reduces early benefits by 15 percent 
per year, rather than by the existing 6% percent. The mul-
tiple for retirement at age 62 would therefore be .55, rather 
than .80 as at present. (A similar proposal was rejected in 
Congress in 1981.) 
Effects on the intertemporal budget set 
Increasing the normal retirement age to 68 (Experiment A) 
lowers retirement benefits by more than $ 1,000 per year, 
or about $17,000 for men retiring in their early sixties; the 
reduction is almost as large for those deferring retirement 
until age 65. Another effect of Experiment A is to tilt the 
Social Security benefit structure toward actuarial neutrality, 
in stark contrast to the pre-reform situation, which contained 
a penalty for continuing to work. Thus, increasing the nor-
mal retirement age lowers benefits at all early retirement 
ages and provides new financial incentives to remain on the 
job longer. 
Experiment B, in which the cost-of-living adjustment is 
postponed 6 months, reduces annual benefits by $100 to 
$200, which translates into diminished present discounted 
values of at most $1,600. Because the income amounts 
involved are small, this reform does not appreciably alter 
the pattern of discounted benefit gains obtained by deferring 
retirement. 
Experiment C raises the late retirement credit to match 
the early retirement reduction factor. Benefits are increased 
after age 65, raising annual benefits by as much as $800 at 
age 68. Present value at age 68 increases by $6,000—still 
not enough to achieve actuarial neutrality, but substantially 
reducing the penalty (in present discounted value terms) for 
continuing to work beyond age 65. 
Experiment D lowers early Social Security benefits, hold-
ing benefits beyond age 65 the same. For a worker retiring 
at age 62 or before, the annual benefit would have fallen 
by $1,700 and present discounted value by some $21,000. 
The gain in present discounted value of Social Security 
benefits for an extra year of work before age 65 would be 
$6,000 to $9,000. This reform would create a powerful 
penalty for retiring early and a powerful incentive for con-
tinued work. Yet, as we shall see, even those forces would 
not change retirement ages very much. 
Effects on retirement ages 
In predicting the changes in retirement ages for each of 
the four reforms, we find the largest effect under 
Experiment D, which cuts benefits al the earliest retirement 
age while offering a larger reward for continued work after 
age 62. Workers would retire about 3 months later on av-
erage, as a result of this reform. Intermediate retirement 
responses are found under Experiment A, which changes 
the normal retirement age. Benefits are lowered by approx-
imately the same dollar amount at every age but the gain 
from working an additional year is unchanged. We predict 
that Experiment A would delay retirement by about 1 xh 
months, on average. The smallest responses occur when 
early retirement benefits are altered the least. Both 
Experiment B (delaying cost-of-living adjustments) and 
Experiment C (raising the late retirement credit) are of this 
type. These reforms are estimated to delay retirement by an 
average of less than 1 week each. 
All in all, the results suggest that workers will work longer 
if Social Security benefits are cut, but not much longer. 
This generic conclusion is consistent with estimates obtained 
by others using different models and simulating different 
reforms. 
Effects on retirement incomes 
Some may have thought that in response to a lower benefit 
schedule, workers would postpone retirement by enough to 
keep their retirement incomes unchanged. However, small 
changes in retirement ages suggest otherwise. Indeed, the 
reforms would cut the Social Security benefits received, 
even after taking account of this lengthened worklife and 
consequent increase in annual Social Security benefits. These 
cuts are as large as 22 percent under Experiment A, which 
increases the normal retirement age. The effects are largest 
under this experiment than under the others, because it re-
duces early retirement benefits a great deal while retaining 
a small incentive for prolonged work. Even though retire-
ment is deferred somewhat, increased employer-provided 
pensions and earnings do not make up the difference. 
Effects on the Social Security system 
The Social Security system's financial problems are al-
leviated under the various reforms to the extent that workers 
work longer or retirees receive less, or both. The increased 
contribution effect is found by multiplying the average de-
ferral of retirement by the average gross earnings in each 
year, and then applying the combined employer/employee 
contribution rate to the result (6.7 percent for each in 1982, 
the year for which calculations were made). The savings to 
the Social Security system from lower benefit payouts is 
simply the mirror image of the loss to workers in present 
discounted value of Social Security benefits. 
In each case, the Social Security system comes out ahead: 
by more than $15,000 in the case of Experiment A (increas-
ing the normal retirement age) and by more than $8,000 for 
Experiment D (changing the early retirement reduction fac-
tor). Given that there are millions of Social Security recip-
ients, the system would gain billions of dollars if these 
reforms were implemented. For example, if 20 million workers 
(the number now receiving Social Security benefits) were 
each to receive $15,000 less on balance in the course of 
their lifetime, the system would gain some $300 billion. 
This surpasses by more than $100 billion the Social Security 
deficit that was viewed as unacceptable and which prompted 
the Social Security amendments of 1983. Yet, even this 
huge sum would go only a small part of the way toward 
meeting the multi-trillion dollar long-term deficit of the 
system. • 
FOOTNOTES 
'See Gary S. Fields and Olivia S. Mitchell, Retirement, Pensions, 
and Social Security (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1984). 
2
 Says Robert P. Quinn (forthcoming), who formulated one of the earlier 
models: "Until relatively recently, analysts tended to describe the mag-
nitude of retirement income rights by the size of the annual benefit, or by 
its close relative, the replacement rate. Though useful summary statistics, 
these annual flow concepts ignore key aspects of the retirement incentives, 
in particular, how annual benefits change with continued work or with 
inflation after retirement." 
'Some might question whether retirement is a choice at all or whether 
it is compelled by poor health or mandatory retirement. The U.S. evidence 
shows that the great majority of workers could go on working (that is, 
their health is sound and they have not yet reached the age of mandatory 
retirement in their firms) but elect to retire earlier, presumably to enjoy 
more leisure. See Fields and Mitchell, Retirement, Pensions, and Social 
Security, for a summary of this literature. 
To estimate how Social Security and other income sources affect work-
ers' choices of retirement ages, information is required on the actual re-
tirement age chosen and the intertemporal budget set facing each worker. 
We constructed the necessary data for a sample of 1,024 white males 
covered by the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey for the years 1969 
through 1977. To these data, we fit an ordered logit model. 
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